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2-

LIMITATIONS OF TIME

CPLR 214: Adoption of tort statute of limitations and time of accrualfor
strict products liability.
The tortuous development of strict products liability' as an independent cause of action 2 remedying injury caused by defectively
manufactured products3 has led to both confusion 4 and anomaly. 5
I See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973), discussed in The Survey, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 611, 616 (1974). See also
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Greenberg v. Lorenz,
9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961); Randy Knitwear v, American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965). But see Noel, Defective
Products:Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93 &
n.4 (1972).
3 See generally Murphy, New Directions in Products Liability, 612 INs. L.J. 40 (197.4)
[hereinafter cited as Murphy]; Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict
Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963 (1957); Prosser, Products Liability in Perspective, 5 GONZAGA L.
REV. 157 (1970); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L. J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791 (1966); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 612 INs. L.J. 141
(1974); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); Note, Strict Products
Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 916 (1964); Comment, The Last Vestige of the
Citadel,
2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 721 (1974); The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 170, 172 (1974).
4
See, e.g., Lewis v. John Royal & Sons, 79 Misc. 2d 304, 357 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct.
Broome County), affd, 46 App. Div. 2d 304, 362 N.Y.S.2d 262 (3d Dep't 1974) (contract
rules applied to a "tort claim"), discussed in The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 576, 578 (1975);
Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 40 App. Div. 2d 289, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (4th Dep't 1973) (tort
rules applied to what court called breach of warranty or strict tort liability).
Much of this confusion has stemmed from Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25
N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969) (4-3 decision), wherein the Court
stated that strict liability in tort and implied warranty, absent privity, are actually the same
cause of action. Id. at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494. See 7B MCKINNEY'S
CPLR 214, commentary at 429-30 (1972) (equating strict liability in tort with breach of
implied warranties is merely "an artificial attempt to squeeze warranty [theory] into a contract mold despite the absence of privity"); 1 WK&M
214.13; Note, Manufacturer's Strict
Tort Liability to Consumers for Economic Loss, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 401, 403 (1967) (strict
liability in tort must be recognized in place of the fictional implied warranty based on
personal injury); The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 170, 172 (1974).
' See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 214, commentary at 429-30 (1972); Siegel, ProcedureCatches
Up -And Makes Trouble, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 63, 66 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Siegel]
(Mendel departs from Court's own charted path of easing plaintiffs recovery by holding his
action time barred by contract statute of limitations).
In addition, the retailer or wholesaler, often an innocent intermediary, may find himself
liable to the consumer but without further recourse to the manufacturer if the contract time
of accrual and statute of limitations are applied to and time-bar his action. See Caruloff v.
Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 445 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971), affg 314 F. Supp. 631
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 561, 565 (1972);
Ibach v. Grant Donaldson Serv., Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 39, 326 N.Y.S.2d 720 (4th Dep't
1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 768, 772 (1972); C.K.S., Inc. v.
Helen Borgenicht Sportswear, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 650, 253 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1st Dep't 1964)
(per curiam), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 561, 565 (1972); Murray,
Random Thoughts on Mendel, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 86, 89-90 (1970); Siegel, supra, at 69-70.
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Particularly problematic has been the determination of an appropriate statute of limitations and time of accrual.6 In Victorson v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 7 a consolidation of personal injury and property damage actions brought against a manufacturer of products
claimed defective by remote users, the New York Court of Appeals
resolved that the applicable statute of limitations under the theory
of strict products liability is the three-year tort statute of limitations8 and that such period does not begin to run until the injury is
sustained.9 In so holding, the Court expressly overruled its previous decision to the contrary in Mendel v. PittsburghPlate Glass Co.,"1

'See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 634-35 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment b (1965).
7 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975), affg 44 App. Div. 2d 702,
355 N.Y.S.2d 565 (2d Dep't 1974) (4-1 decision), affg mem. Victorson v. Kaplan, 75 Misc. 2d
429, 347 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1973), discussed in The Biannual Survey, 48
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 611, 616 (1974). Along with Victorson, the Court affirmed Brown v. 1580
St. John's Place, Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 705, 354 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.) (4-2
decision), as well as Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 316, 354 N.Y.S.2d
654 (2d Dep't 1974) (3-2 decision), discussed in The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 170, 172
(1974).
The Bock Laundry Machine Company manufactured and marketed a centrifuge extractor to spin water out of laundry before it was placed in a dryer. In all three cases, a safety
lock failed to operate, causing injury to the plaintiff-users more than six years after the date
of sale.
8 37 N.Y.2d at 399-400, 335 N.E.2d at 279, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 44-45. See CPLR 214(4), (5).
By applying the tort rather than the contract statute of limitations, the Court has in yet
another area treated what has become termed strict products liability as a tort. See, e.g.,
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436-37, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82-83, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1963) (4-3 decision) (breach of warranty "is not only a violation of the
sales contract out of which the warranty arises but is a tortious wrong suable by a noncontracting party"); Rooney v. S.A. Healy Co., 20 N.Y.2d 42, 46-47, 228 N.E.2d 383, 386, 281
N.Y.S.2d 321, 325 (1967) (defective design actionable in breach of warranty despite sale as a
used product); Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 124-25, 305 N.E.2d
750, 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 623 (1973) (disclaimer valid under the Uniform Commercial
Code no defense to strict products liability claim). See also 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[5][g], at 3-367 (1975) (had the words "strict liability in tore'
been used in Goldberg rather than the warranty concept employed, Mendel might have been
decided differently).
9 37 N.Y.2d at 399, 335 N.E.2d at 278, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 43. The Court observed that
most, although not all, claims for injury to person or property begin to run from the date of
injury. Id. at 403, 335 N.E.2d at 278-79, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 44. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Mount
Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969) (malpractice
action for foreign object left in body is exception to rule and statute of limitations only
begins to run from time of reasonable discovery), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 500, 507 (1971); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287,
200 N.E. 824 (1936) (tort action accrues upon injury); 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS LABILITY § 40.01[2] (1975) (products liability cause of action should accrue only
when defect is or should have been discovered); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 899, comment c,
at 525 (1939) (limitation period does not usually begin to run until tort is complete). For a

discussion of accrual of warranty actions, see Harris v. Markin, 256 App. Div. 907, 10
N.Y.S.2d 269 (1st Dep't 1939) (per curiam) (breach of implied warranty of authority to
contract accrues when repudiated, not when discovered) and N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725(2)
(McKinney 1964) (if warranty extends to future performance, cause of action accrues when
"breach is or should have been discovered" or at date of delivery).
10 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969) (4-3 decision), criticized in
Symposium on Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 62 (1970).
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which had applied the then applicable contract statute of limitations and time of accrual, i.e. six years from the date of sale. 1
The plaintiffs in Victorson would have been time-barred under
the rule of Mendel. Only the adoption of a tort theory would make
their actions timely. Judge Jones, writing for the Court, reasoned
that since the parties had no prior relationship, the causes of
action should accrue and the time within which to bring their
actions should be established in accordance with negligence rather
than contract principles. 12 Noting that the liability imposed on the
manufacturer is based primarily on policy considerations, 1 3 the
Court quoted an earlier decision to the effect that
"[a]ny Statute of Limitations reflects a policy that there must
come a time after which fairness demands that a defendant
should not be harried; the duration of the period is chosen with
a balancing sense of fairness to the claimant that he shall14 not
unreasonably be deprived of his right to assert his daim."'
Apparently, the Court of Appeals has become more concerned
with the injured plaintiff's foreclosure from suit than with its previously expressed fear that "unfounded suits" might be brought
years after the product left the manufacturer's plant.' 5 The Court
1125 N.Y.2d at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494. The sales in Vidorson, as in
Mendel, were consummated prior to September 27, 1964, and therefore would be governed
by a six-year limitation period under CPLR 213(2). Sales consummated after that date would
be subject to a four-year period under N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (McKinney 1964). CPLR
213(2) remains applicable, however, with regard to contracts other than those for the sale of
goods.
Although the contract statute of limitations with regard to contracts for sale is often
referred to as running from the date of sale, the correct phraseology is that the cause of
action accrues "when tender of delivery is made." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (McKinney 1964)
(emphasis added).
12 37 N.Y.2d at 403-04, 335 N.E.2d at 279, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
13 Id. at 401, 335 N.E.2d at 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 42. This social policy is predicated
upon the presumption that the industry which markets the sophisticated products of today is
best able to initially absorb the loss through insurance coverage, eventually passing it on to
all consumers as part of the purchase price. The individual will usually buy the product
without the knowledge necessary to examine it fully for defects. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d
330, 340-41, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 467-68 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965); Bischoff, Comments on Mendel, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
71, 74-75; Murphy, supra note 3, at 41.
14 37 N.Y.2d at 403, 335 N.E.2d at 279, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 44, quoting Caffaro v. Trayna,
35 N.Y.2d 245, 250, 319 N.E.2d 174, 176, 360 N.Y.S.2d 847, 850-51 (1974).
15 In Mendel the Court stated:
we are willing to sacrifice the small percentage of meritorious claims that might
arise after the statutory period has run in order to prevent the many unfounded
suits that would be brought and sustained against manufacturers ad infinitum.
25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
The Court's change in emphasis since Mendel may be related to its change in composition. The two members of the present Court of Appeals who participated in the Mendel
decision are Judge Breitel, now Chief Judge, who wrote the vigorous dissent therein and
Judge Jasen, who, although a member of the Mendel majority, has seen fit to join a Court
unanimous in handing down the Victorson decision.
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posited that the lapse of time could be detrimental to both parties:
impeding the manufacturer's capability to defend and hindering
the plaintiff in his burden of proving that the product was defective as it left thq hands of the manufacturer. 1 6 Additionally, a
plaintiff would have to prove that such defect was the proximate
7
cause of his injuries.'
Although initially observing that the plaintiffs in Victorson were
remote users without any prior association with the defendant
manufacturer, 1 8 Judge Jones by his sweeping rationale strongly
suggests that the Victorson result will also be reached in strict products liability claims brought by purchasers. Acknowledging the consensus of authority to the effect that strict products liability
"'sounds in tort exclusively, and not at all in contract,'"19 Judge
Jones, citing Codling v. Paglia,2" declared that "the liability imposed
on the manufacturer under strict products liability, whether it be to
purchaser, user, or innocent bystander, is predicated largely on
considerations of sound social policy."' 2 1 The adoption of the tort
18 37 N.Y.2d at 404, 335 N.E.2d at 279, 373 N.Y'S.2d at 44. See, e.g., Swain v. Boeing
Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965); PROSSER,
supra note 6, § 103, at 674.
17See, e.g., Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 122, 305 N.E.2d 750,
752, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 621 (1973); Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340,
346, 351, 253 N.E.2d 207, 210, 213, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495, 499 (1969) (Breitel, J.,
dissenting); Keeton, Products Liability -Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect,
41 TEXAS L. REV. 855, 858 (1963); Murphy, supra note 3, at 42.
18 37 N.Y.2d at 399-400, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 40. Characteristically, the
Court has cautiously limited its decisions to the individual facts presented in developing the
theory of strict products liability in New York. See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963); Greenberg v. Lorenz,
9 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 173 N.E.2d 773, 775-76, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1961); MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
1937 N.Y.2d at 402, 335 N.E.2d at 278, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 43, quoting Prosser, Spectacular
Change: Products Liability in General, 36 J. CLEV. B. Ass'N 149, 168 (1965).
20 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973), discussed in The Survey, 48
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 611, 616 (1974).
21 37 N.Y.2d at 401, 335 N.E.2d at 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 42 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). The social policy involved is discussed in note 13 supra.
Codling, another opinion authored by Judge Jones, held that an "innocent bystander"
may recover under a theory of strict products liability, 32 N.Y.2d at 335, 298 N.E.2d at 624,
345 N.Y.S.2d at 463, while at the same time holding that such theory would apply to any
person if certain conditions were complied with, id. at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628-29, 345
N.Y.S.2d at 469-70. Judge Jones stated:
We accordingly hold that, under a doctrine of strict products liability, the manufacturer of a defective product is liable to any person injured or damaged if the defect
was a substantial factor in bringing about his injuries or damages; provided: (1) that
at the time of the occurrence the product is being used ... for the purpose and in
the manner normally intended, (2) that if the person injured or damaged is himself
the user of the product he would not by the exercise of reasonable care have both
discovered the defect and perceived its danger, and (3) that by the exercise of
reasonable care the person injured or damaged would not otherwise have averted
his injury or damages.
Id. (emphasis added). The cumulative effect of the broad language utilized in both Codling
and Victorson, it is submitted, belies charges of mere obiter dicta.
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theory, the rejection of the contract theory, and the underlying
premise of "sound social policy" all militate in favor of a logical
extension of Victorson to a purchaser's action in strict products
liability, 22 thus affording him the tort statute of limitations and

time of accrual.
Indeed, Judge Fuchsberg, in a concurring opinion, drew this
implication from the majority opinion,23 extending his discussion
to consider the effect of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) on

a consumer purchaser's action in strict products liability. 2 4 Judge

Fuchsberg, relying on legislative cognizance and inaction in the
face of judicial development of strict products liability, concluded
that the UCC was not meant to preempt such an action. 5 Thus, as
the UCC was not meant to preempt the development of strict
products liability, neither should it abort the availability of a tort
statute of limitations and time of accrual to a consumer purchaser. 26 Noting the exceptions made to the requirements of
notice,2 7 disclaimer,23 and privity2 9 in warranty actions brought by
22

Cf. Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644
(1973), wherein the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment in face of an action by a purchaser-plaintiff based on negligence, breach of
warranty, and "strict liability in tort." But see Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345, 298
N.E.2d 622, 630, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 472 (1973) (Jasen, J., concurring) (majority opinion
construed to "recognize a right of recovery in strict products liability for nonpurchasers and
nonusers").
23 37 N.Y.2d at 405, 335 N.E.2d at 280, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 45 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
24
1d. at 405-08, 335 N.E.2d at 280-82, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 45-48. See generally 1 WK&M
214.14a; Rapson, Products Liability Under ParallelDoctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform
Commercial Code andStrict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Shanker, Strict Tort
Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential
Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communications Barriers, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 5 (1965); Wade, Is
Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TEN. L. REv. 123 (1974).
25 37 N.Y.2d at 406, 335 N.E.2d at 280-81, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 46. Judge Fuchsberg's view
is supported by a consideration of the following commenmts N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2
(McKinney 1964) (Code treatment of warranties not di'signed to disturb growing line of
cases recognizing warranties "need not be confined eithe( to sales contracts or to the direct
parties to such a contract"); id. § 2-318, Comment 3 (Code does not intend "to enlarge or
restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain"); id., N.Y. Ann. at 317 (Code
nowise
"intended to limit the extension of warranty protection by the courts").
26
Judge Fuchsberg stated that "the choice of the tort rule for all persons injured in such
cases would ... appear to partake of the virtues of simplicity and equality of application ...
37 N.Y.2d at.405, 335 N.E.2d at 280, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
27 N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4 (McKinney 1964) (notification within a reasonable
time is to be judged by different standards when applied to a retail consumer). See also
Silverstein v. R.H. Macy & Co., 266 App. Div. 5, 9, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920 (1st Dep't 1943)
(predecessor of § 2-607 held inapplicable to personal injury action and commencement of
suit held sufficient notice).
28 N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316 (McKinney 1964) is much tempered by id. § 2-302 (unconscionability) and id. § 2-719(3) (personal injury disclaimer "prima facie unconscionable" with
respect to "consumer goods"). See also Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d.
117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973) (disclaimer between employer and manufacturer not applicable to employee in personal injury action); Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons,
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consumers to recover for personal injuries, Judge Fuchsberg observed that if strict products liability had not evolved through
decisional law as it did, the UCC itself might well have independently reached a similar result. 30 He also intimated that the exclusive application of the UCC in the context of time limitations be
3
confined to commercial relationships. 1
Also raised in Victorson is the question of whether a nonpurchaser's extended breach of warranty action has been merged into
the strict products liability theory, thus depriving a nonpurchaser
of an action governed by the contract statute of limitations and
time of accrual. Notably, Judge Jones observed that "[dlepending
on the factual context in which the claim arises, ' 32 a plaintiff may
frame his complaint in negligence, express warranty, implied warranty, or "some combination thereof."3 3 Moreover, a choice of
theories arguably does not flow from the case law development. In
Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc., 34 one of three appellate division
decisions affirmed in Victorson,33 the second department, while es36
tablishing a tort limitation period for strict products liability,
35 App. Div. 2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 613,
282 N.E.2d 126, 331 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1972) (disclaimer between lessor and manufacturer held
unconscionable in action based upon lessor's liability for lessee's personal injuries); Walsh v.
Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969)
(disclaimer held prima facie unconscionable in personal injury action).
In Victorson, however, is an intimation that a disclaimer may be a valid defense to a
personal injury action in some circumstances. See 37 N.Y.2d at 407 n.2, 335 N.E.2d at 281
n.2, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 47 n.2 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring) (Velez not inconsistent with extension
of Victorson to consumer purchasers); Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117,
124-25, 305 N.E.2d 750, 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 623 (1973) (disclaimer may be valid under
proper circumstances); Winant v. Approved Ladder & Equip. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 965,
298 N.Y.S.2d 796 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.), aff'd mem., 28 N.Y.2d 529, 267 N.E.2d 885, 319
N.Y.S.2d 72 (1971) (disclaimer held valid against copartner in personal injury action); cf.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw §§ 5-322, -323, -325 (McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1975), invalidating exculpatory clauses as to negligence with regard to particular relationships.
29 N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 3 (McKinney 1964), states that this section is not
meant to interfere with the abandonment of the privity requirement in consumer cases. See
also N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney Supp. 1975), amending ch. 553, [1962] N.Y. Laws 2618,
wherein a seller's warranty is extended to "any natural person," regardless of whether he is a
member of the family or household or a guest. This amendment apparently attempts to
bring the Code in line with case law developments in strict products liability, viz Codling.
30 37 N.Y.2d at 407, 335 N.E.2d at 281, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
31
Id at 407-08, 335 N.E.2d at 281-82, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 48. See also N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 2-719(3) (McKinney 1964) (disclaimer with respect to personal injuries from consumer
goods prima facie unconscionable, whereas disclaimer with respect to commercial loss valid).
3237 N.Y.2d at 400, 335 N.E.2d at 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
33

Id.

34 44 App. Div. 2d 316, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1974), discussed in The Survey, 49 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 170, 172 (1974).
" See note 7 supra.
36 44 App. Div. 2d at 325, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 663. Of course, the appellate division was
constrained by the binding precedent of Mendel. Id. at 322, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
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stated that Mendel remains the law in terms of warranty actions. 37
The Victorson court, in affirming the applicability of the tort statute
of limitations and time of accrual to a strict products liability claim,
38
overruled Mendel only to the extent of its "contrary" holding.
Thus, Mendel apparently retains viability as to warranty claims. Yet,
the Court's analysis of strict products liability indicates that the
action is the end-growth of the extension of implied warranty to
"plaintiffs who were neither buyers nor users of the product '3 9 and
that it is uniquely tortious in nature. 40 It is therefore possible that
the courts may decide that the sole essence of the action brought is
in fact tortious 4 1 and disregard any breach of warranty claim by a
nonpurchaser.
Significant in this inquiry is that Victorson did not overrule
Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp.,4 2 which had served as a basis for
Mendel. 43 In Blessington the plaintiff's infant son died as a result of
burns received when clothing purchased from the defendant retailer ignited. Despite the absence of privity the Court of Appeals
allowed this survival action based on the theory of breach of implied warranty of fitness for use.4 4 In addition, the Court, conferring the "benefit" of the longer contract statute of limitations, 4 in
effect saved the claim from being dismissed as untimely, since the
tort limitation period had already expired. 4 6 The Mendel Court
followed the rule of Blessington, emphasizing the use of the word
"benefit" therein, but with the result of depriving the plaintiff of an
action which would have been timely under a tort statute of limitations.47 In comparing Blessington with Mendel, Professor Siegel observed that the rule may have been consistent, but the result was
48
not.
In light of the Victorson Court's "sound social policy" approach
in determining the appropriate statute of limitations,4 9 it would
37 Id. at

326, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
3137 N.Y.2d at 400, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
39d. at 401, 335 N.E.2d at 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
40
Id. at 402, 335 N.E.2d at 278, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 43; text accompanying note 19 supra.
' Cf. Loehr v. East Side Omnibus Corp., 259 App. Div. 200, 18 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1st Dep't
1940), affd, 287 N.Y. 670, 39 N.E.2d 290 (1941) (mem.); Hermes v. Westchester Racing
Ass'n, 213 App. Div. 147, 210 N.Y.S. 114 (1st Dep't 1925) (true nature of liability determines
statute of limitations).
4-305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
43 25 N.Y.2d at 344, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
44 305 N.Y. at 146-47, 111 N.E.2d at 422-23.
45
Id. at 147, 111 N.E.2d at 423.
46Id. at 146, 111 N.E.2d at 422.
4125 N.Y.2d at 343, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
48Siegel, supra note 5, at 67.
49See note 13 supra.
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seem paradoxical to extend the "benefit" of a tort statute of limitations and time of accrual to save one nonpurchaser's claim and yet
deny the "benefit" of a contract limitation period which may be
necessary to save that of another. It is submitted that nonpurchasers should have the option of bringing their actions under an
extended breach of warranty theory subject to the contract statute
of limitations. As Professor Siegel indicated, Blessington should be
50
an alternative route open to all plaintiffs.
Apparently, the legislature has attempted to ensure the independent existence of a warranty action by amending section 2-318
of the UCC to extend warranties, whether express or implied, to
"any natural person if it is reasonable to expect that such person
may use, consume or be affected" by the defective product and
he suffers injury thereby.5 ' Exactly to whom this amendment extends coverage is not yet clear, 52 although it would appear that
breach of warranty actions no longer need be "extended" to cover
nonpurchasers. The courts, however, by noting the independence
of actions under the Code from the case law development of strict
products liability and by limiting the Code to situations "essentially"
commercial, 53 have already set the stage for refusing to recognize
this section's applicability to the consumer plaintiff. In terms of the
manufacturer, this may be a just result, since otherwise, he will be
subjected to two distinct limitation periods with respect to consumer claims.
10 Siegel, supra note 5, at 67. One of the lower court decisions affirmed by Victorson
pointed out, however, that Blessington preceded the erosion of the "citadel of privity" and
that the action therein was brought against an intermediary retailer rather than against the
manufacturer. Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 316, 323, 354 N.Y.S.2d
654, 660-61 (2d Dep't 1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
Additionally, it must be noted that the Blessington situation may be explained by the "household goods" exception to the privity requirement for warranty actions which was subsequently established by the Court of Appeals. See also Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195,
199, 173 N.E.2d 773, 775, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1961), where the Court's rationale centered
around the "injustice of denying damages to a child because of nonprivity."
51 N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney Supp. 1975), amending ch. 553, [1962] N.Y. Laws
2618.52
See Memorandum by Assemblyman Leonard Silverman in Support of A. 3070, ch.
774, § 1, 198th Sess. (1975) which indicates that, while the amendment was intended to
extend warranty protection to all third parties, it was specifically aimed at the recipients of
gifts.
'3 See notes 24-31 and accompanying text supra. See also Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash,
Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 316, 324, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654, 662 (2d Dep't 1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 395,
335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
Notably, Professor Prosser has stated:
Once the step has been taken of declaring that this is not a matter of warranty at all,
and that the statute does not govern, it is difficult to see how any warranty provision
in the Code can be controlling.
PROSSER, supra note 6, at 658 (citation omitted).
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Although Victorson has resolved the controversy concerning the
statute of limitations and time of accrual applicable to a remote
user in a strict products liability action, the above discussion indicates the need for further clarification as to strict products liability.
Such clarification can only be achieved by the legislature. 54 Until
such time the practitioner seeking damages for injuries due to a
defective product should plead his action alternatively on all possi55
ble theories of liability conceivably available.
ARTICLE

9-

CLAss

ACTIONS

CPLR art. 9: Legislature adopts liberal class action statute.
Article 9 of the CPLR, the new class action law, 5 6 promises to
effect substantial changes in state litigation by opening judicial
doors which heretofore have been virtually closed.5 7 The new arti54 Recently, the legislature indicated its concern with facilitating the recovery of injured
plaintiffs by making changes in related areas of the law. See note 51 and accompanying text
supra.
Another recent legislative change is the enactment of comparative negligence in New
York. CPLR 1411-13. The new law applies to causes of action accruing on or after September 1, 1975. Id. 1413. CPLR 1411 states that recovery for personal injury or property
damage shall not be barred on account of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence
is a broad term, however, and must be narrowed in its application to actions in strict
products liability. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 42; Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use,
Contributoy Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 105, 119 (1972). A strict
products liability action is subject to the following defenses: the product was being improperly used, a reasonable inspection by the user would have revealed the defect -nd its
danger, or the plaintiff with reasonable care could have avoided his injuries. See note 21
supra. A reading of the new statute and its legislative history reveals that CPLR 1411 was
intended to apply to actions based on strict products liability as well as breach of warranty
when brought to recover for personal injury or property damage. See THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE CPLR, comment (a), as
appearingin [1975] N.Y. Laws 1483 (McKinney) regarding N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 10-101
(subsequently enacted as art. 14-A of the CPLR); Memorandum from Stanley Fink to N.Y.
Assembly, reprinted in 173 N.Y.L.J. 78, Apr. 23, 1975, at 7, col. 1. For a discussion of
situations where comparative negligence should or should not be applied in strict products
liability actions, see Schwartz, Strict Liability and ComparativeNegligence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171
(1974).
55 Additionally, the practitioner should be aware that the injured consumer plaintiff
may be able to bring a cause of action in the federal district courts under the Consumer
Product Safety Act §§ 2 et seq., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973). If the defective
product is covered by the Act and the plaintiff is injured as the result of a knowing or willful
violation of a rule or order of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, he may recover
damages sustained, costs, and, at the discretion of the court, reasonable attorney fees. The
plaintiff, however, must satisfy the requisite $10,000 amount in controversy. Id. § 23, 15
U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. III, 1973), discussed in Note, The Consumer Product Safety Act: A Federal
Commitment to Product Safety, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 126, 150-52 (1973).
56 Ch. 207, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 313 (McKinney), as amended, ch. 474, § 1, [1975] N.Y.
Laws57713
class action billtext
wasinfra.
signed by the Governor on June 17, 1975.
See (McKinney).
notes 61-63 The
and accompanying

